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PROPERTY AND SPEECH IN SUMMUM 
Joseph Blocher* 
INTRODUCTION 
City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum1 is, by its own reckoning, a case 
about government speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.2  Even so, most commentary has justifiably focused on the de-
cision’s implications for another part of the First Amendment: the Estab-
lishment Clause.3  This brief Article addresses yet another feature of 
Summum—what it draws from, and says about, the relationship between 
speech rights and property ownership.4  This relationship is not only the 
driving force behind the majority’s opinion, but is also an important tool for 
understanding government speech in other cases involving government in-
trusion into speech markets, which often involve speech that is less physical 
than the monuments at issue in Summum.5 
Part I of this Article discusses the intersection of property rights and 
government speech in Summum.  Part II explores how that intersection il-
luminates three often-hidden characteristics of all speech: ownership, riva-
lry, and excludability.  Focusing on these concepts may help explain the 
property-like characteristics of speech (even when it takes forms less physi-
cal than the monuments in Summum), and whether property ownership is it-
self a communicative act. 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Duke Law School.  I owe debts of gratitude to the Northwestern University 
Law Review Colloquy for assembling this mini-symposium, and to Chris Lund, Bernie Meyler, and 
Nelson Tebbe for their valuable comments on this Article.  All errors are exclusively my own speech 
and property. 
1  129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (link). 
2  Id. at 1129 (“[T]he placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form 
of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”). 
3  See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 46 (2009) (noting that Summum “was not an Establish-
ment Clause case,” but that it “nevertheless reveals much about the course that the Supreme Court is 
now charting with the Establishment Clause”) (link). 
4  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg characterized the case as being one about property.  See Summum, 
129 S. Ct. at 1138 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“This case involves a property owner’s rejection of an offer 
to place a permanent display on its land.”). 
5  Writing years before the contemporary government speech doctrine took shape, Steven Shiffrin 
presciently noted that “[t]he government speech question has usually reached the Supreme Court in con-
troversies concerning how public property should be used.”  Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 
UCLA L. REV. 565, 572 (1980) (emphasis added). 
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I. PROPERTY AND SPEECH IN SUMMUM 
In Summum, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not 
require the City of Pleasant Grove—which had established a public park 
that presented various privately donated monuments—to accept a monu-
ment donated by Summum, a religious organization.  Rather than analyzing 
the case as a restriction on Summum’s speech, however, the Court held that 
the City’s selection of monuments was a form of government speech and 
therefore entirely beyond the reach of the Free Speech Clause.   
Despite the apparent clarity of its bright-line conclusion, Summum was 
decided in a heavy shadow.  Looming in the background was the fact that 
the monuments—both Summum’s and those earlier accepted by the City, 
such as the Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order 
of the Eagles6—were arguably “religious,” such that the City’s adoption of 
them threatened to violate the Establishment Clause.  But it was not the Es-
tablishment Clause that drove the Court’s opinion; nor was it solely a con-
cern for protecting the government’s need (or perhaps “right”) to express its 
own viewpoints, which was the rationale behind other government speech 
cases like Rust v. Sullivan7 and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Associa-
tion.8  Rather, Summum was, at its heart, a case about the relationship be-
tween property ownership and speech—about the communicative value of 
ownership, the physical impossibility of allowing free construction of 
communicative monuments on government property, and the right of a 
speaker-property owner to exclude other speakers and property users.  
These three incidents of the relationship between property and speech re-
veal much about the nature of government speech more generally. 
First, Summum held that by deciding which monuments would appear 
in the park and which would be excluded, the City was effectively “speak-
ing.”9  In other words, the court held that by exercising its property rights, 
Pleasant Grove was exercising its speech rights as well.  There are at least 
two ways to make sense of this relationship between communication and 
property.  First, it could be said that the act of selecting and approving a 
monument is itself a communicative act on the part of the property owner, 
regardless of its impact on observers.  Alternatively, and drawing on the 
reasonable viewer principle articulated by some Justices in Establishment 
 
6  Although the issue was not presented in Summum, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) 
(link), the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a Ten Commandments monu-
ment donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. 
7  500 U.S. 173 (1991) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a regulation denying federal mon-
ey to family planners who provided information about abortion) (link). 
8  544 U.S. 550 (2005) (finding that the government speech doctrine precluded the First Amendment 
claim of cattle producers who were forced to pay a fee for generic beef advertising) (link). 
9  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (majority opinion). 
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Clause cases like Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,10 it 
could be said that—no matter what the property owner subjectively in-
tends—speech occurs where a reasonable observer would think that a prop-
erty owner’s acceptance of a monument or other speech act on his property 
amounts to approval and communication of its message.11  And although 
this viewer-centered approach may incorporate some notion of property 
ownership (as Justice Stevens has noted, we generally presume that a per-
son endorses messages displayed on his property12), it is not entirely co-
incident with the property-owner-as-speaker approach.13  In Summum, the 
Court found it unnecessary to choose between these two theories, holding 
that the City was “speaking” in its selection of monuments and that a rea-
sonable viewer would recognize it as doing so: “The monuments that are 
accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a 
government message, and they thus constitute government speech.”14  
Whether either or both—intent to speak and effect on the viewer—are pre-
requisites of government speech therefore remains unclear.  
Second, the Court pointed to the physicality and permanence of mo-
numents, and suggested that if the government had no power to regulate 
them then the park in Pleasant Grove—as well as many other federal 
lands—could become overrun, thus effectively (even if not officially) limit-
ing the ability of other would-be speakers to communicate.15  But it seems 
that it is neither monuments’ permanence nor their physicality that helps 
transform them into government speech; rather, it is the combination of the 
two.  Were it otherwise, the government would “own” the speech of any 
private speaker temporarily located on public land.  And just as physical 
presence on public property is not determinative, neither does the “perma-
nence” of the communication occurring there turn it into government 
speech.  A powerful speech delivered on public property may live longer in 
public memory than the sturdiest monument, but that permanence, alone, 
does not make it government speech.  The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I 
Have a Dream” speech may well be a cultural touchstone long after the 
 
10  See 515 U.S. 753, 773, 779 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (concluding that a Latin cross in a park across from the Ohio Statehouse did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because a reasonable observer would not see it as an endorsement of religion) (link). 
11  Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 587, 588 (2008) (arguing that “a public entity seeking to claim the government speech defense 
must establish that the contested expression is governmental in origin both formally . . . and functional-
ly”) (link). 
12  Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
13  See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (discussing Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 
(9th Cir. 2008) (link), cert. granted sub. nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (link), to be ar-
gued before the Court in the Fall of 2009). 
14  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
15  Id. at 1138.  See also Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that a requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality would require governments to “brace themselves for an influx of clutter”) (link). 
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steps of the Lincoln Memorial where he delivered it have crumbled into 
dust, but that does not mean the government can claim the speech as its 
own. 
Instead, it seems that what troubled the Court was the combination of 
monuments’ permanence and their physicality.  Because of these two cha-
racteristics, the Court noted, “parks can accommodate only a limited num-
ber of permanent monuments.” 16  Monuments “monopolize the use of the 
land on which they stand and interfere permanently with other uses of pub-
lic space.”17  In economics and in property law, the idea that one person’s 
use of a private good precludes another person’s enjoyment of its benefits is 
a fundamental concept known as rivalrousness.  Along with excludability, 
rivalrousness is considered to be the defining characteristic of a private 
good,18 which, in turn, is a basic building block of property theory. 
It is unclear whether First Amendment law has—or should have—a pa-
rallel concept.  In most cases, the “marketplace of ideas” is presumed to be 
infinitely elastic, a place where multiple people can hold and express iden-
tical viewpoints without anyone’s right to that viewpoint being infringed.19  
But when acts of speech (as opposed to the “viewpoints” they express) rely 
on some kind of physical manifestation, rivalrousness becomes a serious 
problem.  If Pleasant Grove’s park must be open to all monuments, then 
some would-be speakers (both private and public) may be crowded out by 
those who arrive and construct their monuments first.  In Summum, the 
mere possibility of this outcome drove the Court to accept the government 
speech argument and to reject its main competitor—public forum analysis: 
“[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to 
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”20  
The Court has, of course, faced this problem most prominently in a series of 
cases that attempted to define the role of the government as a regulator.  
And in some of those cases—including those involving “physical” speech, 
like ads on the sides of buses—the Court has endorsed the clutter-
prevention rationale, as it did in Summum.21 
Finally, and drawing on these principles of communication and clutter 
prevention, the Court held that in order to express its own viewpoint and 
protect the ability of private parties to express theirs, Pleasant Grove had 
the right to exclude unwanted speakers such as Summum by rejecting their 
monuments.  The right to exclude is, of course, frequently considered to be 
 
16  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137. 
17  Id. 
18  See DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 16 (2005). 
19  Intellectual property scholars might rightly object that this is an over-simplification—the law 
does protect ideas through patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret.  I agree, and discuss those con-
cepts below. 
20  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
21  See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion) (link). 
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the most important stick in the “bundle” of property rights.22  But the right 
to exclude—whether held by a public or private property owner—also lim-
its the potential forums in which speakers can deliver constitutionally pro-
tected speech: the right to exclude conflicts with the right to speak where 
one wants.  Consequently, the First Amendment may permit (or even re-
quire) limits on a property owner’s ability to exclude.23  The Court has, for 
example, upheld a state statute forcing mall owners to allow protesters on 
their private property, even though they disagreed with the protestors’ 
viewpoints and would otherwise have had the right to exclude them.24  That 
limit on a property owner’s right to exclude seems to disappear, however, 
when it is the government that is the speaker-property owner, at least where 
the government can claim that decisions about inclusion and exclusion are 
an aspect of the government’s speech. 
II. SPEECH AND NON-PHYSICAL PROPERTY 
Summum is thus in many ways a case about government property as 
well as government speech, and the specific type of property at issue in the 
case is both physical and permanent.  But of course principles of property 
and ownership are not limited to physical, permanent property such as mo-
numents,25 and the doctrine of government speech covers (indeed, arose in) 
cases involving speech acts that were much more ephemeral.26  It is there-
fore worth asking how the three principles discussed above—the relation-
ship between ownership and speech, the nature of rivalry, and the right to 
exclude—apply to non-physical government speech. 
A. Ownership and Speech 
Speech rights and property rights have been intertwined for as long as 
both have existed.  Effective speech is in many ways dependent on private 
property rights,27 and some scholars have gone so far as to celebrate the 
 
22  See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (describing the right to exclude 
as “universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right”) (link); Lee Anne Fennell, Ad-
justing Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2009) (noting that excludability has dominated 
property scholarship) (link). 
23  Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity, and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 21, 56 (1997) (criticizing First Amendment decisions that “force[] the holders of private 
property to surrender their right to exclude”). 
24  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (link). 
25  Were it otherwise, intellectual property would be a very shallow doctrine indeed.  
26  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (evaluating as “government speech” a regulation that 
prevented public funds from being used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning). 
27  See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory 
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1547 (2008) (arguing that “[i]n order to give free speech rights content, . 
. . the Court must shield economic entitlements from political revision”) (link); Epstein, supra note 23, 
at 52 (“As a general matter, freedom of speech is best protected when property rights are well-
defined.”). 
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“Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment.”28  While 
it is far beyond the scope of this Article to explore in detail the intersection 
of speech rights and property rights in constitutional doctrine, some genera-
lizations may be useful, particularly as they relate to the connection be-
tween government property and government speech.  
First Amendment doctrine often has been concerned with the questions 
of if and when private property rights must yield to private speakers.29  The 
Summum paradigm addresses if and when public property rights must do so.  
In some limited cases involving “quasi-public” private property, the First 
Amendment creates a kind of constitutionally mandated easement, allowing 
a would-be speaker to use the property regardless of its owner’s property 
and speech rights.30  To be sure, this abrogation applies more commonly to 
non-physical property than to physical property like malls.31  In Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, for example, the Court upheld the FCC fairness 
doctrine, endorsing a rule that certain circumstances may require a property 
owner (i.e., broadcaster) to broadcast speech with which he disagrees.32  But 
Summum suggests that such easements do not exist at all on government-
owned property—at least not if the Court applies the government speech 
doctrine instead of forum analysis.  Government speech is simply absolute.  
In fact, it is worth asking if Summum would have prevailed if the park, a 
“quasi-public” space at the very least, had been privately owned.  In such a 
case, the private property owner would not have the benefit of the absolutist 
protection the government gets under government speech doctrine.  It is not 
enough to say that no private property owner would be forced to accept a 
monument on his property, because it would be too significant of an intru-
sion on his property rights.  In Summum, the Court’s reliance on govern-
ment speech doctrine neither requires nor permits consideration of the 
degree to which the government’s property rights were burdened.  Where 
 
28  See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996). 
29  See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74; Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254–56 
(1974) (rejecting an argument that the First Amendment compels newspapers to provide politicians with 
a right of reply) (link). 
30  E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (upholding First Amendment claims on pri-
vately owned land) (link).  See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (describing the “First Amendment easement”); Paul E. McGreal, The Case for 
a Constitutional Easement Approach to Permanent Monuments in Traditional Public Forums, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 185 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/41/LRColl2008n41McGreal.pdf (link). 
31  See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 
319 (1968) (bringing shopping malls within the Marsh rule) (link); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 
518–21 (1976) (overturning Logan Valley and upholding a mall owner’s right to exclude picketers) 
(link); Seidman, supra note 27, at 1565 (noting that the Supreme Court “has sharply constrained the 
reach of the constitutional theory” underlying the Marsh line of cases). 
32  395 U.S. 367 (1969) (link).  See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
518 U.S. 727, 737, 740–53 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Breyer, J.) (evaluating the constitutionality of a 
federal statute permitting private cable operators to limit “indecent” programs) (link). 
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government speech applies, it operates as a total exemption from the First 
Amendment, not as a trigger for a balancing test. 
On this score, one could perhaps compare the category of “quasi-
public” private property to the “limited public forum.”  The former category 
consists of private land that has been partially opened to the public; the lat-
ter of public land that has been partially closed.  But in Summum, the Court 
explicitly rejected Summum’s invitation to view the case through the lens 
of forum analysis.33  Had the Court applied forum analysis, it almost cer-
tainly would have concluded (as the Tenth Circuit did34) that the public park 
was, like most parks, a public forum.  Such public forums may, of course, 
be “owned” by the government as a matter of property law, but that does 
not mean that the government retains the most important stick in its bundle 
of property rights—the right to exclude.35  Indeed, the purpose and effect of 
public forum analysis is to limit the government’s ability to invoke that ba-
sic property right by subjecting such exclusions (at least when they involve 
constitutionally protected speech) to a rigorous and often fatal form of strict 
scrutiny that requires the government to show a compelling justification 
that could not be served by more narrowly tailored means. 
The Court—to Pleasant Grove’s great relief—avoided this road by ap-
plying government speech doctrine instead.  And there is a big difference 
between saying that the government as a property owner can exclude un-
wanted speech acts without violating the free speech clause and saying that 
doing so is itself a speech act exempt from scrutiny. The difference is not 
merely semantic, because when the government speaks (as opposed to when 
it excludes), it has a near-absolute right to control its message.  The follow-
ing subsections consider the degree to which the government’s message—
like any speaker’s—can be controlled in property-like fashion. 
B. Speech and Rivalry 
As noted above, the outcome in Summum was dictated by a view of the 
particular speech market at issue—the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s 
park—as one in which every private speaker’s speech threatened to displace 
another’s, since the construction of one monument necessarily limits the 
space available for the next one.  This, of course, is rivalrousness—the no-
tion that one person’s use of a good (here, space in the park) precludes 
another person from using it.  The Court seemed to think that the physicali-
ty of the monuments created this problem of rivalrousness.  But is it true 
that only permanent, physical speech acts like monuments threaten to prec-
lude other speakers?  It may well be that other non-physical speech acts, or 
even viewpoints themselves, can be rivalrous.  If so, then speech and prop-
 
33  City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
34  See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002) (link). 
35  See supra note 22. 
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erty share a defining characteristic, and the connection between them is that 
much stronger. 
It is often supposed that non-physical viewpoints are not rivalrous be-
cause speech markets are infinitely elastic—adding one speaker does not 
limit another’s ability to speak.  But this is not necessarily true.  Nearly all 
speech in the marketplace of ideas defeats, displaces, or drowns out other 
speech.  It is, in fact, a baseline assumption of the competitive marketplace 
of ideas that some speech acts will prevail over others.36 Accordingly, free 
speech scholarship and doctrine have long struggled with what to do when 
large, powerful private speakers such as wealthy corporations drown out 
other private speakers.37  Such concerns carry special weight when the gov-
ernment speaks because it not only has a booming voice, but can also back 
its words with unique coercive power.  Accordingly, many of the primary 
objections to government speech doctrine are derived from the threat that 
the government will crowd out other voices or distort discourse due to the 
authority of its voice.38 
Even holding aside these communication-related complications, as a 
simple matter of doctrine, government speech jurisprudence gives the gov-
ernment enormous power to crowd out rivalrous speech.  As Summum de-
monstrates, government speech completely displaces the rights of private 
speakers because government speech falls entirely outside the ambit of the 
Free Speech Clause.  The Court explained in Johanns that “the Govern-
ment’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”39  This 
makes the doctrine particularly potent because First Amendment jurispru-
dence does not recognize a category of “mixed” government-private 
speech.40  Thus, where the government is speaking, no private actor can 
share rights in the message.  Private speakers may be allowed to share the 
government’s platform as a matter of government grace—indeed, govern-
ment speech doctrine arose from cases in which the government spoke 
through private actors41—but these private speakers have no more First 
Amendment right regarding the government’s position than a guest in a pri-
vate home has a property right to the house. 
 
36  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (creating the 
marketplace metaphor and stating that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market”) (link). 
37  See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (upholding 
a challenge to a campaign finance law preventing corporations from purchasing “issue ads” close to 
election day) (link). 
38  See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380–81 (2001); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 
56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005). 
39  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
40  See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2008) (“We generally characterize speech as either private or governmental, 
and this dichotomy is embedded in First Amendment jurisprudence.”) (link). 
41  See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (link). 
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Of course, private speakers remain free to agree or disagree with the 
message the government delivers; they just cannot do so in a way that inter-
feres too much with the government’s chosen method of delivering its mes-
sage.  The government does not have the right to exclude people from 
having viewpoints altogether.  But that is not necessarily any different than 
saying that Suzette Kelo is free to live in a house, just not the one whose 
physical taking was upheld in Kelo v. City of New London.42  To be sure, the 
justifications and means by which private property and private speech can 
be “taken” are not the same, and the cases differ in that Suzette Kelo’s 
home was privately owned before the government took ownership of it.  
But this may be troubling for First Amendment theorists who think of the 
speech market as a place that (like the property market) is presumptively 
private, even when speech acts take place on public property.  Whether or 
not the cases can be distinguished on those grounds, an underlying principle 
of both Summum and Kelo is that a private actor’s rights may be displaced 
by the government’s presence in a market.  Private and public speech, con-
sidered in this sense, are rivalrous. The following subsection considers the 
degree to which that intervention carries with it the right to exclude. 
C. Excludability 
It is impossible to describe the intersection of speech and property 
without at least attempting to incorporate the right to exclude.  In terms of 
the speech-property paradigm, the right to exclude is not easy to concep-
tualize (how can one “exclude” somebody from having a viewpoint?), but 
the issues it raises are nonetheless fundamental.  If the speech-property me-
taphor is expanded to include the ephemeral “marketplace of ideas,” rather 
than just physical speech monuments, can the concept of exclusion usefully 
inform the metaphor?  In other words, can viewpoints and ideas—even if 
not represented in physical form—be “excludable”? 
The answer to these questions is quite clearly yes, at least sometimes. 
Intellectual property rights, for example, extend property-like protections 
(including, of course, excludability) to ideas, even if those ideas are not re-
duced to some kind of physical form like a monument.  Once an idea is pa-
tented or copyrighted, the owner of the idea can seek injunctive relief to 
prevent others from utilizing it without the owner’s permission.  She can, 
effectively, prevent trespass on her property, thereby limiting the rights of 
others, including their speech rights.43  In other areas, the exclusion or rejec-
tion of other viewpoints is the very essence of a speech act. As Christopher 
Lund rightly points out in his thoughtful article, religious endorsements on-
ly work when other views are rejected—because “to endorse every message 
 
42  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (link). 
43  Of course, these property-like protections have their own First Amendment implications. See 
generally DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009). 
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is really to endorse no message at all.”44  Without a right to exclude other 
messages, the speaker cannot communicate his own. 
In one important but underappreciated regard, government speech be-
haves in the same way.  This is because courts have found that where gov-
ernment speech exists, it is absolute.45  That is, no other speaker can assert a 
free speech right in the government’s message, no matter how closely 
bound up with the government’s speech that private speaker’s message 
might be.  In an effort to do away with this bright line, scholars have advo-
cated46—and courts have considered47—recognizing a category of “mixed,” 
public-private speech.  Justice Kennedy signaled some sympathy for this 
approach when, at oral argument in Summum, he lamented “the tyranny of 
labels.”48  Justice Souter wondered, “Isn’t the tough issue here the claim that 
there is—is in fact a mixture, that it is both Government and private[?]”49  
Justice Breyer added, “[T]he problem I have is that we seem to applying 
these subcategories in a very absolute way.  Why can’t we call this what it 
is—it’s a mixture of private speech with Government decisionmaking . . . 
[?]”50  But unless and until the Court actually calls things like they are, the 
government will retain an absolute and exclusive “right” to its speech.  
The rejection of the Summum monument presents one obvious way in 
which this absolutist doctrine allows the government to exclude speakers 
seeking to join the government’s speech.  But it is also useful to ask what 
happens to private speakers whose messages (and perhaps property rights) 
are already mixed with the government’s.  They, no less than Summum, 
have a direct stake in how the government chooses to express its message.  
Consider, for example, what would happen if the City had accepted the Fra-
ternal Order of Eagles’ Ten Commandments monument but then altered it 
with a plaque saying, “The City has accepted and adopted this monument to 
serve as a stark reminder of the oppression and violence celebrated by re-
prehensible groups like the Fraternal Eagles.”  Would the Fraternal Order 
have a free speech claim under the First Amendment?  Under Summum, it’s 
hard to see how they would.  As the Court noted: “[T]he thoughts or senti-
ments expressed by a government entity that accepts and displays such an 
object may be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”51  
 
44  Lund, supra note 3, at 52. 
45  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (holding that if the City 
“were engaging in [its] own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application”). 
46  See Corbin, supra note 40. 
47  See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794, 799 (4th Cir. 2004) (link). 
48  Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 4892845 
(link). 
49  Id. at 10–11. 
50  Id. at 23–24.  He joined the Court’s opinion only “on the understanding that the ‘government 
speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category.” Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., con-
curring). 
51  See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136. 
104:83  (2009) Property and Speech in Summum 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/ 93 
The Order’s most plausible First Amendment claim would probably be that 
the City’s re-branding of the plaque violates the rule against compelled 
speech by forcing the Order to be a part of a message it obviously does not 
endorse.  The essence of the claim would be that the Eagles did not stop 
“speaking” when they gave the City the property rights to the monument, 
but that the City, through its plaque, had distorted the Eagles’ message.  
Unable to stop speaking so long as the monument was identified as theirs, 
the Eagles would thereby be compelled to speak.52  But recognizing a pri-
vate speaker’s compelled speech claim would mean abandoning the view 
that government speech is beyond the purview of the Free Speech Clause.  
Who gets to exclude whom? 
These are all just preliminary questions about excludability and gov-
ernment speech.  Any conception of excludability in the property-speech 
paradigm depends almost entirely on the view of rivalrousness sketched out 
in the previous sections.  If speech rights are non-rivalrous—if everyone 
can equally use and possess them—then it makes less sense to talk about 
“exclusion.”  But if speech acts, or viewpoints themselves, are rivalrous, 
and for the reasons explained above there are good reasons to think that 
they are, then it naturally follows that some speakers must have a right to 
“exclude” others. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its unanimity and the apparent clarity of its holding, Summum 
raises complicated questions about how the marketplace of ideas incorpo-
rates conceptions of property, including such fundamental questions as how 
physical property is or can be transposed into the marketplace of ideas and 
how ideas themselves have property-like characteristics.  Is ownership a 
speech act, and under what conditions?  Does establishing property rights in 
the real world market necessarily establish rights in the marketplace of 
ideas, and vice versa?  Are viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas really 
non-rivalrous?  Intellectual property rights aside, does a speaker have a 
right to “exclude” other speakers from the physical (or non-physical) ma-
nifestations of his viewpoint?  And why do the answers to these questions 
seem to differ when the government, rather than a private party, is speak-
ing? 
Of course, Summum is not the first case to raise (or fail to answer) 
these questions.  The intersection of property and speech frequently arises 
in Establishment Clause cases, where courts must analyze whether the gov-
ernment’s ownership of certain displays “respect[s] an establishment of re-
 
52  Consider the example of moral rights in copyright law, which allow artists to preserve the integri-
ty of their work even after it has become somebody else’s property.  My thanks to Nelson Tebbe for 
bringing this fascinating point to my attention. 
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ligion.”53  In this sense, the interesting private speaker in Summum is not 
Summum, but the Fraternal Order of the Eagles.  At some point, the Ten 
Commandments monument the Order built was undoubtedly private speech.  
And it seems quite likely that, eventually, it became government speech 
within the meaning of the Establishment Clause.  The key questions are 
how and when.  As noted above, there are at least two ways to answer this 
problem—either speech occurs when a property owner (i.e., the govern-
ment) selects which speech acts to allow on its property, or speech occurs 
when a reasonable viewer (i.e., the public) would believe that the property 
owner is engaging in speech of its own by permitting the speech acts of 
others to take place on its property. 
In Summum, the Court was able to avoid choosing between these con-
ceptions by finding that the distinction would not change the result.54  But 
matters are not always so simple.  In Buono v. Kempthorne,55 scheduled for 
oral argument this Fall, the Court will consider whether the Establishment 
Clause requires the government to tear down a cross, privately constructed 
and maintained, that stood for 70 years on public property in a large federal 
park.  For purposes of the present discussion, the complicating factor in Bu-
ono is that Congress has attempted to convey to a private party the small bit 
of land on which the cross stands.  Congress’s evident intent was to remedy 
any Establishment Clause problem by transferring the property to private 
owners.  But despite the formal transfer of ownership, the cross and the land 
on which it stands will almost certainly continue to be perceived as gov-
ernment-owned.  Will the transfer of property from the government to a 
private party suffice to destroy government speech, just as transfer from a 
private party to the government in Summum was sufficient to create it?  And 
if not, what is the government supposed to do? 
Like Summum, Buono is a case about public and private property as 
much as it is a case about public and private speech.  Both cases require 
courts and scholars to confront difficult and still-unanswered questions 
about the relationship between speech and ownership. 
 
 
 
53  U.S. CONST. amend. I (link).  See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) 
(establishing a three-prong test to evaluate legislation under the Establishment Clause) (link). 
54  Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1134. 
55  Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Salazar v. Buono, 
129 S.Ct. 1313 (2009). 
